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1. INTRODUCTION1)
The economic growth and transformation of the Korean economy from
1962 to the present has been truly remarkable (see e.g., Harvie and Lee,
2003a and 2003b). From being a poverty stricken and economically
backward country in 1962 with a GDP per capita of only US$82, by 2005
this exceeded US$16,000 and the country had become the fourth largest
economy in Asia (after China, Japan and India on a PPP basis) and the
twelfth largest in the world (again on a PPP basis) (see Wikipedia, 2005).
Export driven growth provided the basis for this rapid and sustained period of
economic growth, such that by 2005 Korea had become the world’s eleventh
largest exporting nation (Central Intelligence Agency, 2006) and thirteenth
largest importing nation (Central Intelligence Agency, 2005). The country
had, therefore, achieved an impressive record of growth and integration into
the high tech global economy.
The economy has, however, experienced periods of economic turbulence:
the heavy and chemical industries drive of the early 1970s, the economic and
political turmoil arising from the assassination of President Park in 1979, the
export driven rapid expansion of the economy in the late 1980s, the growth
slowdown in 1992-1993 from stabilization policy aimed at reducing
inflationary pressure, the collapse of the exchange rate in late 1997 that
exposed long standing weaknesses in the country’s development model, the
subsequent severe economic slowdown in 1998, the ‘tech wreck’ of 2001
arising from slowing world demand for IT related products upon which the
economy is heavily dependent for export growth, the credit card bubble of
2002 and 2003 and the subsequent weakening of domestic demand.
In this context the primary aim of the paper is twofold. First, to conduct a
robust empirical analysis of the timing of major structural breaks for the
Korean economy, employing macroeconomic data covering the period
1980Q1 to 2005Q1, utilizing the Innovational Outlier (IO) and Additive
1)

The authors wish to acknowledge the editor, and two anonymous referees for their useful
comments on a previous draft of this paper. The usual caveat applies.
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Outlier (AO) models developed by Perron (1997). This empirical analysis
also involves a comparison of results for non-stationarity of the data using
the conventional Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test, with that
obtained from the IO and AO models. It is essential to correctly identify
structural breaks in data for any economy: first, to avoid model
misspecification and coefficient bias using such data, and, second, to ensure
that tests for data non-stationarity are robust. Second, to provide an
interpretation of the major factors that have contributed to these structural
breaks, specifically in terms of key policy changes and other domestic and
external sources of economic turbulence.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly overviews Korean
macroeconomic developments from the early 1960s to 2005. Section 3 briefly
discusses conventional unit root tests that do not take into consideration the
potential existence of structural breaks, and presents empirical results based
on the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. Section 4 conducts a brief
review of testing procedures which do take into account the presence of
potential structural breaks in the data, discusses the Perron (1997) Innovational
Outlier (IO) and Additive Outlier (AO) models, and presents empirical
findings based on these methodologies. This section also provides the
context to explain the reasons behind, and the importance of, the identified
structural breaks. Finally, section 5 presents some concluding remarks.

2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE KOREAN MACRO-ECONOMY
This section provides the context for our empirical analysis, and the
importance of robust identification of potential structural breaks in
macroeconomic data for an economy prone to periods of economic
turbulence. For identification and analysis of periods of economic turbulence
in the case of Korea, and hence for the existence of potential structural breaks,
it is useful to break its period of prolonged growth into a number of phases:
the establishment of a growth and development strategy (1962-1971), the
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heavy and chemical industries drive (1972-1979), economic stabilization and
liberalization (1980-1989), economic opening up, global integration and
financial crisis (1990-1997), post crisis reform and restructuring (1998 to the
present). Each of these periods is now briefly discussed in turn.
2.1. Growth and Development Strategy 1962-1971
This period saw the introduction of sweeping economic reforms
emphasizing exporting, focusing on labour intensive light manufacturing
industries (see Harvie and Lee, 2003a, 2003b; Lee, 1996; Ranis, 1971; Smith,
2000; Song, 1990). Export targets were agreed between government and
individual firms, with emphasis placed on the development of firms best able
to expand export capacity and acquire and utilize technology. Government
owned banks facilitated this process through their preferential allocation of
credit to such firms. Consequently, from the early days of economic
development, a relationship based system developed among firms, their
banks and the government (Smith, 2000).
This development strategy proved to be highly successful. The average
annual growth rate was 8.8% during 1962-1971, double that prior to 1962.
Per capita income increased from US$82 in 1961 to US$286 in 1971. The
industrial structure of the country changed dramatically, with the share of
manufacturing increasing from 12% to 20% of GDP over the same period.
Exports increased rapidly from US$41 million in 1961 to US$1,133 million
in 1971 (a 28 fold increase), representing an average annual growth rate of
39%. The strategy increased domestic savings and employment, and enabled
the economy to benefit from economies of scale in production and
technology transfer.
2.2. The Heavy and Chemical Industries (HCI) Drive (1972-1979)
Despite the previous impressive outcomes the development strategy
changed from the early 1970s, arising from a number of adverse side effects

Testing for Structural Breaks in the Korean Economy 1980-2005

183

from the export driven growth (see Harvie and Lee, 2003a, 2003b). First, it
contributed to a sectoral imbalance between the light and heavy industry
sectors. Second, the export orientated industrialization program widened the
gap between those engaged in export business and those in domestic business.
Finally, by the early 1970s light industry exports began to weaken,
highlighting the need to develop new exportable products. Consequently, in
May 1973, Korea shifted from general export promotion and incentives to the
targeting of strategic HCIs (steel, heavy machinery, automobiles, industrial
electronics, shipbuilding, non ferrous metals and petrochemicals). Industry
neutral incentives for exports were replaced by industry specific and, in some
cases, firm specific measures involving generous government assistance
(Smith, 2000). The main tool of promotion was, again, preferential access to
credit from government owned banks, funded predominantly by external
bank borrowing that resulted in a rapid rise in foreign debt. Other HCI
incentives included subsidies, tax reductions and exemptions (Rhee, 1994).
Without such government incentives large companies would not have been
willing to bear the risk and cost of such extensive investment in these
industries.
The HCI promotion strategy resulted in a number of economic problems:
rapid monetary expansion and increased budget deficits, investments were
made without sufficient analysis of their viability and impact on the overall
economy, and there were many overlapping investments, the focus on
strategic industries resulted in enormous economic inefficiency, the
socialization of bankruptcy risk, combined with the low interest rate ceilings,
contributed to moral hazard in the banking and corporate sectors, that
encouraged, for firms in targeted sectors, excessively high levels of debt and
an emphasis on market share rather than profitability and shareholder value
(Huh and Kim, 1994). The HCI drive gave a major boost to the growth of
the chaebol, which radically transformed the industrial structure and market
concentration (OECD, 1994).
The economy showed signs of overheating during 1976-1978,
accompanied by a rapid increase in wages that surpassed the growth of
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labour productivity. This was exacerbated further by the Middle East
construction boom in 1976 and its impact on domestic land prices. These
caused one of the country’s worst bouts of inflation that resulted in weakened
export competitiveness, and slowed export and overall economic growth.
2.3. Economic Stabilization and Liberalization (1980-1989)
Against a backdrop of: the second oil price crisis; a bad agricultural
harvest; and a domestic political crisis with the assassination of President
Park in October 1979, the first negative rate of GDP growth since the
emergence of Park’s regime (1961-1979) emerged in 1980, and consumer
price inflation soared to 28.7%. HCI investment and a global and domestic
economic downturn combined to leave many of the heavily targeted
industries of the 1970s with severe over-capacity problems in the early 1980s.
Against this background a major shift by the new government focused policy
upon economic stabilization, trade liberalization, financial liberalization,
market opening, promotion of small and medium enterprises, antitrust
legislation, greater opening to foreign investment, preferences for specific
industries to be reduced, and structural change toward the development of
more technology based industries (Smith, 2000).
By the mid 1980s the economic stabilization measures had achieved their
desired objectives, as inflation decreased and the economy recovered its
competitiveness, productivity and growth. From 1986 to 1989 economic
conditions were given a further boost by favourable external conditions from
the three lows – low oil price, weak US dollar, and low global interest rates.
In 1986, for the first time in Korea’s modern history, the nation’s current
account shifted into the black, where it remained until 1990, the balance of
payments was in sizeable surplus, exports exceeded imports and domestic
savings exceeded domestic investment for the first time since the First Five
Year Plan (Harvie and Lee, 2003b). The economy registered a high annual
growth rate of 12%. Industrial restructuring also made headway with the
share of the manufacturing sector in total GNP rising from 29.7% in 1980 to
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32.3% by 1987. By late 1988, however, a presidential election, the Olympic
games, abnormally high wages and incomes growth, steeply rising land
prices, and ongoing structural problems in the economy combined to severely
jolt economic stability and economic growth slowed to 8% in 1989 (Lee,
1996).
2.4. Economic Opening and the Onset of Financial Crisis (1990-1997)
The period of the 1990s witnessed Korea’s increased integration into the
global economy through further external trade and financial liberalization
that represented a natural extension to the liberalization measures adopted
during the 1980s. However, the seeds of the financial crisis that were to hit
in late 1997, already planted during the periods previously discussed, were
further exacerbated by developments and measures implemented during
1990-1997.
Economic growth remained strong during this period with the exception of
an economic slow down in 1992-1993 arising from a significant slowdown in
investment expenditure, as well as decline in consumption expenditure, as
part of a stabilization policy to reduce inflationary pressure during 1990-1991.
However, the benign macroeconomic environment of the 1990s,
characterized by: high GDP and export growth until 1996; low inflation;
fiscal surpluses in general; high savings and investment; low unemployment;
and, until 1996, modest trade and current account imbalances, hid growing
financial weaknesses in the heavily indebted and weakly profitable corporate
sector, reflecting the tendency of business conglomerates to diversify into
capital-intensive industries, and financial sector and an unprecedented
accumulation of short term debt (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade, 1999; Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1998; The Economist, 1998;
Kwon, 1998; Lee, 1999a and 1999b; Min, 1998; Park, 1998; and Radelet and
Sachs, 1998a and 1998b). The latter increasingly exposed the country to
financial turbulence in global and regional markets. This process was driven
by the financial liberalization of the early 1990s as an already fragile
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domestic financial system, a legacy from earlier periods, was encumbered by
moral hazard, poor supervision and regulation, heavy government
intervention, poor accounting standards and lack of transparency and
underdeveloped capital markets, contributed to a significant increase in short
term capital flows (mainly in the form of debt and relative to foreign
exchange reserves).2)
Such fragilities were of little concern, however, in an environment of rapid
growth of exports and output. With the deterioration of the country’s terms
of trade and resulting growth slowdown in export values in 1996 and 1997,
however, the highly over-leveraged corporate sector came under intense
profitability and cash flow pressures. In 1997 a number of chaebol became
insolvent or had to seek protection from creditors. An already shaky
financial sector, arising from imprudent and excessive lending to the chaebol,
experienced a further sharp deterioration in non-performing loans.
Government action to tackle this problem head on was lacking. By October
1997 further pressure began to be strongly applied by international investors
on the currency as concerns over the third major fragility, excessive short
term foreign debt, came in to play. The ability of the country to meet its
short-term interest and debt repayments was questioned as useable foreign
exchange reserves diminished alarmingly. The consequence was the
financial and economic crisis of 1997-1998.
2.5. Reform and Restructuring 1998-present
Korea made remarkable advances after the 1997 financial crisis, achieving
an average annual growth rate of 6% over the period 2000-2004, enabling it
to be one of Asia’s few expanding economies. Despite this, turbulence
within the economy from domestic and external sources was still prevalent.
In 2001 the slowing global economy and falling exports due to the ‘tech

2)

Korea’s short-term foreign debt was high relative to its international reserves, a consequence
of its decision to liberalize short term borrowing rather than direct investment inflows
(Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1999).
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wreck’ (reduced global demand for IT products and falling semi-conductor
prices) accounted for the drop in the growth rate to 3.3%. The credit card
bubble of 2001 and 2002 contributed to strong domestic demand, but this
was reversed in late 2002 as households reduced consumption following a
period of rapid accumulation of debt and once again, in 2003, the economy
entered a recession. Despite weak domestic demand the acceleration of real
export growth, to a historical high of 20%, supported output growth of 4.6%
in 2004. Exports slowed significantly in the first half of 2005, due in part to
weaker demand from China which had become an increasingly important
trading partner.
Key contributory factors to the country’s economic performance from
1998-present have been: reform progress in areas of weakness exposed by
the financial crisis, market opening to international competition, strength in
key sectors of the economy, particularly in the information and
communications technology (ICT) sector, and strong external demand
particularly from China which has emerged as Korea’s biggest trading
partner. The country’s economic performance is also underpinned by
significant inputs of labour and capital, reflecting still-rapid population
growth, rising labour force participation rates and a high level of investment.
Nearly half of the major business groups (the chaebol) have disappeared,
while foreign ownership of listed companies has increased from 15% to 42%.
Rising foreign direct investment includes an important foreign presence in
the banking sector.
According to the OECD (2005) there are a number of outstanding issues
essential to the maintenance of the economy’s performance: maintaining
macroeconomic stability and sound public finances, the need to upgrade the
innovation system to promote faster productivity gains by improving the
R&D framework, improving labour productivity which stands at around onehalf of the OECD average, strengthening product market competition,
restructuring tertiary education to enhance human capital, enhancing labour
market flexibility, further improving corporate governance, increasing
efficiency in the corporate sector, ensuring better supervision of the financial
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sector and reducing the legacy of extensive government intervention in the
economy, upgrading competition policy and continuing the process of
opening up to international trade and foreign direct investment.
In the context of this brief overview of the Korean economy the remainder
of this paper is devoted to: analyzing macroeconomic data for the Korean
economy with the objective of conducting a robust empirical analysis of the
existence and timing of major structural breaks in the economy, and linking
such breaks, where relevant, with key economic developments as identified
in this section of the paper.

3. UNIT ROOT TESTS WITHOUT STRUCTURAL BREAKS
It is essential to test for the existence of a unit root when using time-series
data for model estimation. Failure to do so means that the standard
asymptotic distribution theory does not apply, resulting in model
misspecification, coefficient bias and spurious estimation inferences
(Campbell and Perron, 1991; Afandi, 2005).
The standard procedure for detecting non-stationary behaviour in data is to
use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979,
1981) using the following equation
k

Δyt = μ + β t + α yt −1 + ∑ ci Δyt −i + ε t ,

(1)

i =1

where yt is the time series being tested, t is a time trend variable, Δ denotes
the first difference operator, and k is the number of lags which are added to
the model to ensure that residuals, ε t , are white noise. The Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) or Schwartz Information Criterion (SBC) are
then used to determine the optimal lag length in the ADF equation. The ADF
test is principally concerned with the estimation of α in the above equation,
that is we test the hypothesis H 0 : α =0. The rejection of the null hypothesis
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Table 1 Data Description and ADF Test Results for Korean Economy
Macroeconomic Data, 1980Q1-2005Q1
Description of series

Variable

Period of the data

GDP at 1995
Ln (GDP95) 1980Q1-2005Q1
constant price
Gross national
income at current
Ln (GNI) 1980Q1-2005Q1
price
Private consumption Ln ( P )
1980Q1-2005Q1
c
at current price
Government
consumption at
current price
Gross fixed capital
formation at current
price

ADF
Optimal
Inference
t-statistic lag length
–2.205

7

Unit root

–1.872

8

Unit root

–1.258

5

Unit root

1980Q1-2005Q1

–0.424

4

Unit root

Ln (GFCF) 1980Q1-2005Q1

–1.657

4

Unit root

Ln ( Gc )

Total export (US$)

Ln (X)

1980Q1-2005Q1

–0.941

8

Unit root

Total imports (US$)

Ln (IM)

1980Q1-2005Q1

–0.623

2

Unit root

Ln (CPI)

1980Q1-2005Q1

–2.193

0

Unit root

Ln ( M s )

1980Q1-2005Q1

–1.624

1

Unit root

Ln (ER)

1980Q1-2005Q1

–2.012

0

Unit root

Consumer price
index
Money supply at
current price
Exchange rate
(National currency
per US$)

Notes: 1) The null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level for
all variables under investigation.
2) The optimal lag length (k) is determined by the Schwartz Information Criterion
(SBC). The data used was obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics
(IFS).
Source: Derived by the authors.

implies that yt is stationary and integrated of order zero, or I(0). In other
words the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected if the value of the tstatistic for α (in absolute value) is greater than the critical value reported by
MacKinnon (1991). Our empirical results applying the ADF test to Korean
macroeconomic date for the period 1980Q1-2005Q1 are reported in table 1.
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This shows that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for any
of the series under investigation.
Based on our discussion in the previous section, however, the Korean
economy has been subject to considerable economic turbulence over the
period 1980-2005, suggestive that macroeconomic variables are likely to
have been subject to a number of structural breaks, such as that from the
stabilization programs in the early 1990s, the terms of trade shock of the mid
1990s, the financial and economic crisis of 1997-1998, the tech wreck of
2001, the aftermath of the credit card bubble of 2001-2002. Hence the
results of the ADF test on macroeconomic data could be biased towards not
rejecting the unit root hypothesis, since it does not allow for the existence of
such structural breaks. Therefore, it is of interest to analyze how these
results can be affected by allowing for the existence of potential structural
breaks in the data. For this purpose we use both the Perron (1997)
Innovational and Additive outlier (IO and AO) models to make more robust
conclusions about the time series properties of the data series under
investigation.

4. UNIT ROOT TESTS IN THE PRESENCE OF POTENTIAL
STRUCTURAL BREAKS
As is well known the issue of structural change, and its consequential
implications for structural breaks, in macroeconomic time series data must be
robustly addressed in order to ensure non spurious results of unit root tests of
such data. There can, of course, be many reasons for structural change, and
these can include such diverse circumstances as economic crises, policy
changes or regime shifts. For this reason it is extremely important to test the
null hypothesis of structural stability against the alternative of a one-time
structural break. If potential structural changes are not allowed for in the
specification of an econometric model but are, in fact, present, the results
may be spurious because they can be biased towards the erroneous non-
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rejection of the non-stationarity hypothesis (Perron, 1989; Perron, 1997;
Leybourne and Newbold, 2003; Pahlavani, Valadkhani, and Worthington,
2005).
Vogelsang and Perron (1998) describe the long-running debate which was
sparked by Nelson and Plosser (1982) when they concluded that most
macroeconomic time series contain a unit root, and thus implied that shocks
to these series are permanent. Perron (1989) challenged this, showing that a
rejection of the unit root hypothesis is possible for many macroeconomic
time series if a one–time shift in the trend function is taken into account. He
argued that many macroeconomic time series may be better described as
having temporary shocks fluctuating around a broken deterministic trend
function. Afandi (2005) noted that Perron (1989) introduced three models.
The first model is a crash model where the conventional unit root test (ADF
model) is augmented by incorporating a dummy break and a dummy postbreak intercept that represents shifts in the intercept. The second model
captured the effects of the 1973 oil price shock by incorporating a dummy
post-break slope representing a change in the trend due to the slow-down in
economic growth following the shock. The third model combines these two
effects (change in the slope and change in the intercept) in order to represent
the effects on the world economy of the 1929 Stock Market Crash which
precipitated the Great Depression of the 1930s.
According to Vogelsang and Perron (1998), Perron’s (1989) key
assumption is that the break date of the trend function is fixed (exogenous),
and chosen independently of the data. In fact, previously, the time of any
structural break was assumed to be known a priori in accordance with the
underlying asymptotic distribution theory. As mentioned above the standard
Dickey-Fuller procedure (ADF) was then extended by adding dummy
variables representing different intercepts and slopes. However, Christiano
(1992) and others have criticized this approach, arguing that considering the
timing of the break as an exogenously known event invalidates the
distribution theory underlying conventional testing (Pahlavani, Valadkhani,
and Worthington, 2005).
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Consequently, the assumption of considering the timing of the breaks as a
known event has drawn much criticism in subsequent papers. In response, a
number of studies, including Zivot and Andrews (1992), Perron (1994, 1997),
Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) and Bai and Perron (2003) to name just a few,
have proposed different ways of estimating the time of the break
endogenously. These studies have shown that this endogenous approach
lessens the bias in the usual unit root tests. As Perron (1997) states: “…if
one can still reject the unit-root hypothesis under such a scenario it must be
the case that it would be rejected under a less stringent assumption”.3)
In the following section the unit root test on Korean macroeconomic data
is conducted again, but in this case allowing for structural breaks by
estimating the timing of the break endogenously.
4.1. Innovational and Additive Outlier Models

Perron (1994, 1997) advanced a class of test statistics which allows for
two different forms of structural breaks: namely, the Additive Outlier (AO)
model, which is more relevant for series exhibiting a sudden change in the
mean (the crash model), and the Innovational Outlier (IO) model, which is
designed to capture changes in a more gradual manner over time. In other
words, Perron distinguishes breaks that occur suddenly from those which
occur slowly over time by identifying two types of structural breaks and
applying different models to each of them.
According to Vogelsang and Perron (1998) and Pahlavani, Valadkhani,
and Worthington (2005), the IO model is appropriate where it is more logical
to conceptualize the breaks as occurring gradually rather than suddenly.
Following Perron (1994) the IO1 version of the model allows for gradual
change in the intercept only, while the IO2 version of the model allows for
gradual change in both the intercept and the slope of the trend function, as
follows
3)

For a more detailed explanation concerning unit root tests in the presence of structural
breaks, see Phillips and Xiao (1998) and Maddala and Kim (2003).
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K

IO1: xt = μ + θ DU t + β t + δ D (Tb )t + α xt −1 + ∑ ci Δxt −i + et ,

(2)

i =1

K

IO2: xt = μ + θ DU t + β t + γ DTt + δ D (Tb )t + α xt −1 + ∑ ci Δxt −i + et ,

(3)

i =1

where Tb denotes the time of the break, which is unknown and determined
endogenously, DU t is the Intercept dummy ( DU t =1 if t > Tb and zero
otherwise), DTt is the slope dummy ( DTt = t, if t > Tb and zero otherwise),
and finally, D(Tb )t is the crash dummy ( D(Tb )t =1 if t=Tb+1 and zero
otherwise). The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected if the absolute value
of the t-statistic for testing α =1 is greater than the corresponding critical
value. According to Colletaz and Serranto (1998), Perron (1997) applies
three different methods in estimating the break date:
· Minimizing the value of the t statistic for testing α =1
· Maximizing the absolute value of the t statistic on the break parameters
associated with a change in either the intercept (| tθˆ |) or the slope ( | tγˆ | ),
and
· Minimizing the value of the t statistic on the break parameters associated
with the change in either the intercept (| tθˆ |) or the slope | tγˆ |.
Vogelsang and Perron (1998) note that the truncation lag parameter, k, is
determined using the data-dependent method proposed by Ng and Perron
(1995). In this methodology, for any given value of Tb, k is determined
according to the significance (at 5% or 10%) of the t-ratio on the coefficient
associated with the last lag in the estimated auto-regression. The optimum k
(or k*) is selected such that the coefficient on the last lag in an autoregression of order k * is significant and that the last coefficient in an autoregression of order greater than k * is insignificant, up to a maximum order
k= kmax (Perron, 1997; Lumsdaine and Papell, 1997; Pahlavani, Valadkhani,
and Worthington, 2005).
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In contrast to the gradual change in the IO model, the AO model assumes
structural changes take place instantaneously. The additive outlier model
demonstrates a change in the slope of the trend function only, but both
segments of the trend function are joined at the time of the break. Moreover,
as is clear from the above explanation, while the Innovational Outlier model
(IO) involves a one-step testing procedure, the Additive Outlier (AO) testing
procedure consists of a two-step procedure. In other words, testing for a unit
root in the AO framework is done using a two-step procedure (Perron, 1994;
Vogelsang and Perron, 1998, Afandi, 2005). First, the series is de-trended by
regressing it on the trend components (including constant, time-trend and
dummy break):
yt = μ + β t + γ DTt * + y%t ,

(4)

where y%t is the de-trended series and DTt * = (t–Tb) if t>Tb and zero
otherwise. Since equation (4) assumes that a structural break only impacts
on the slope coefficient the second step uses the following regression,
without trend function, to the residual of the first step in order to test for a
change in the slope coefficient
K

y%t = α y%t −1 + ∑ ci Δy%t −i + et .

(5)

i =1

Similar to the IO methodology, these equations are estimated sequentially
for all possible values of Tb (Tb = k + 2, …, T–1) where T is the total number
of observations so as to minimize the t-statistic for α =1. The lag length is
data-determined using a general to specific approach, based on the
significance of the t-statistic. In this methodology the break date is assumed
to be unknown and determined endogenously. The null hypothesis is
rejected if the t-statistic for α is larger in absolute value than the
corresponding critical value. An alternative, which is more widely used, is to
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select Tb as the value over all possible break dates that minimizes (or
maximizes) the value of the t-statistic on γ =0 (Harris and Sollis, 2003;
Pahlavani, Valadkhani, and Worthington, 2005).
4.2. Empirical Results from the IO and AO Models

In order to decide which particular IO model is most relevant the following
model selection procedure is adopted. First, the least restrictive model (IO2)
is estimated and, if tγˆ is significant at the 5% level or better, then the results
are reported in table 2. If tγˆ is not statistically significant then the results
from the IO1 model are presented. In order to determine the sudden effect
of an unknown structural break the AO model is also estimated, and the
results are presented in table 3.
In these models we apply the method of determining the appropriate lag
length endogenously. A data-dependent method for selecting the value of lag
length K is applied in this research. According to Ng and Perron (1995) (see
also Ben-David and Papell, 1998), it is better to use the data-dependent
method rather than making an a priori choice of a fixed K. They suggest
starting with an upper bound of Kmax. We consider K as Kmax if the last
lag included in the estimated equation is significant. If the last lag
considered is not significant then K is reduced by one. We continue this
procedure until the last lag becomes significant. If no lags are significant
then K is set to zero. Following Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) and Pahlavani,
Valadkhani and Worthington, (2005), we consider the maximum (Kmax)
equal to eight and, if the coefficient on the eighth lag is significant based on a
t-test (i.e., at least 1.645 in absolute value), then we let K=Kmax. If not K is
continually reduced until significance is achieved, otherwise K is set equal to
zero.
Using the sequential approach the regression equation is run with the
values for Tb of (2…t–1), for each time series. The values of the t-statistic
for variable α are recorded and compared. From this comparison the break
point is then selected by the value of Tb which minimizes the t-statistic on
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Table 2 Innovational Outlier Model for Determining the Break Date in Intercept (IO1), or Both Intercept and Slope (IO2)
Series

Model Type of structural break Lag K tγˆ \ tθˆ

α̂

tαˆ

Inference Break Tb

Ln(GDP95) IO1

Intercept only

7

–3.50

0.563

–3.06 Unit root

1997:03

Ln (GNI)

IO1

Intercept only

8

–2.47

0.906

–2.31 Unit root

1997:03

Ln ( Pc )

IO2

Intercept plus slope

8

3.27

0.827

–2.98 Unit root

1993:03

Ln ( Gc )

IO1

Intercept only

8

–2.66

0.597

–3.53 Unit root

1997:04

Ln (GFCF) IO1

Intercept only

8

–2.811 0.856

–3.13 Unit root

1997:03

Possible causes
Asian financial crisis – currency contagion
triggered by the sharp decline in the value of
the Thai baht, deterioration in economic
confidence and subsequent decline in regional
economic growth.
Asian financial crisis - currency contagion
triggered by the sharp decline in the value of
the Thai baht, deterioration in economic
confidence and subsequent decline in regional
economic growth.
The anti inflationary measures of 1990-91
resulted in a sharp decline in investment and
consumption spending and slowdown in
economic growth during 1992-1993, and
declining wage push.
Asian financial crisis – collapse of the won,
IMF financial assistance sought and related
tightening of monetary and fiscal policy.
Asian financial crisis – currency contagion
triggered by the sharp decline in the value of
the Thai baht, deterioration in business
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Ln (X)

IO2

Intercept plus slope

8

–3.07

0.708

–3.61 Unit root

Ln (IM)

IO1

Intercept only

7

–4.91

0.681

–4.91

Ln (CPI)

IO2

Intercept plus slope

8

2.46

0.883

–4.01 Unit root

1997:04

Ln ( M s )

IO2

Intercept plus slope

7

3.79

0.655

–4.73 Unit root

1991:02

Ln (ER)

IO2

Intercept plus slope

3

4.32

0.560

–5.43

No unit
root

No unit
root

2000:03
1997:03

1997:02
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confidence, increased corporate bankruptcy
and subsequent decline in investment.
Tech wreck, global economy slowdown, semiconductor price crash.
Asian financial crisis – currency contagion
and collapse of regional economies, impacting
adversely on domestic demand conditions.
Asian financial crisis – collapse of the won
triggered an increase in the price of imported
inputs and domestic costs of production,
subsequently impacting upon domestic
inflation outcomes.
Anti-inflationary
stabilization
measures
arising from strong demand (construction
investment in particular).
Asian financial crisis, chaebol bankruptcies,
industrial unrest, poor trading performance,
rising short term debt and inability to service
this debt.

Note: Critical values at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are equal to –5.57, –5.08 and –4.82 respectively for IO2, while for the IO1 model the critical value at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels are equal to –5.41, –4.80 and –4.58 respectively. The innovational outlier model (IO2) allows for breaks in both intercept and slope,
while (IO1) allows for a break just in the intercept. These methodologies assume that changes occur gradually. Tb is selected as the value which minimizes
the absolute value of the t-statistic on the parameter associated with the change in slope in the IO2 model or change in intercept in the IO1 model, (Kmax=
8).
Source: Derived by the authors.
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Table 3 Additive Outlier Model (AO) for Determining the Timing of Breaks
Series

K

Ln (GDP95)

γˆ

α̂

Inference

Break Tb

Possible causes

4

–0.01 –6.65 0.616 –4.61 Unit root

1995:02

Business cycle peaked in 1995; terms of trade deterioration; weakening
yen; end of the equipment and infrastructure investment boom.

Ln (GNI)

8

–0.018 –13.5 0.590 –4.31 Unit root

1994:03 Expansionary government policy; equipment and infrastructure boom.

Ln ( Pc )

8

–0.016 –8.81 0.861 –2.65 Unit root

1997:03 Asian financial crisis.

Ln ( Gc )

8

–0.006 –3.74 0.687 –3.01 Unit root

1993:04 Stabilization policy designed to reduce inflationary pressure.

Ln (GFCF)

8

–0.029 –14.4 0.717 –3.76 Unit root

1994:02 Equipment and infrastructure investment boom.

Ln (X)

8

–0.014 –8.32 0.736 –3.25 Unit root

1985:01 Reduced inflation; improved competitiveness and productivity

–0.014 –6.43 0.809 –2.84 Unit root

Expansionary government policy; domestic market opening to foreign
competition; liberalization of foreign capital inflows; construction and
1994:02 domestic infrastructure investment boom; rising private consumption;
increased imports of capital goods (32.5%), industrial materials (32.6%)
and consumer goods (27.8%).

Ln (IM)

7

tγˆ

tαˆ
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Ln (CPI)

4

–0.004 –7.87 0.890 –4.01 Unit root

Ln ( M s )

7

–0.018 –8.77 0.804 –3.12 Unit root

Ln (ER)

3

0.009 5.27 0.829 –2.64 Unit root
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Price stability became the government’s primary focus. Stable
agricultural prices, increased competition from imports and subdued
consumption spending contributed to low inflation particularly in the
1996:01
second half of 1996. The decline in inflation was also facilitated by
excess capacity arising from the equipment and investment boom of
1994-1995, and by a softening of global demand.
The Hanbo debacle. On 23 January Korea’s second biggest steel
company imploded under a US$5.9 billion debt, which took out its
1997:01 entire parent group the then fourteenth largest Korean conglomerate.
The Bank of Korea swiftly injected 6 trillion won (US$7 billion) in
liquidity to prevent a possible chain reaction of bankruptcies.
Strong economic growth; rapid growth of imports; investment and
1991:01 consumer (industrial materials and consumer goods) boom; trade and
current account blowout.

Note: Critical values at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are equal to –5.28, –4.65 and, –4.38 respectively. The additive outlier model (AO) allows for a break in the
slope and, in this methodology, changes are assumed to occur rapidly. Tb is selected as the value, which minimizes the absolute value of the t-statistic on
the parameter associated with change in slope in the (AO) model, (Kmax= 8).
Source: Derived by the authors.
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the coefficient α . The unit root null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the
alternative hypothesis if the t-statistic for α is significant and greater than
the critical values tabulated by Perron (1997). Results from using the
Innovational Outlier (IO) model are reported in table 2.
As shown in Table 1 the empirical results derived from the conventional
ADF unit root test provide no evidence against the null hypothesis of a unit
root for any of the series under investigation. Similarly, as shown in table 3,
the results from applying the Additive Outlier model, which takes into
account the sudden effects of a potential break, again support the null
hypothesis of a unit root for all of the series under investigation. The results
based on the Innovational Outlier Model in table 2, however, show that by
taking into account the existence of gradual effects of a potential structural
break, two of the variables under investigation (IM and ER) do not have a
unit root. The Zivot-Andrews (1992) method yielded identical results with
the same two variables found to be stationary.4)
The timing of the structural changes based on the IO model (impacting on
both the intercept and the slope (IO2) or intercept only (IO1) of each series)
are represented by a solid line in figure 1, and with a dotted line for the AO
model.
The timing of any structural break (Tb) for each series using both the IO
and AO approaches are shown in tables 2 and 3, respectively. From table 2
the IO model shows that endogenously determined Tbs closely approximate,
for seven of the ten variables, major structural breaks occurring in the
financial crisis year of 1997 (ER in the second quarter), (GDP95, GNI,
GFCF and IM in the third quarter), (Gc and CPI in the fourth quarter). Given
that the 1997 financial crisis was the biggest shock to afflict the Korean
economy during the period of analysis this result would seem to be quite
reasonable. For Ms the timing of the structural break is found to be the
second quarter of 1991, for Pc the third quarter of 1993, while for X it was
found to be the third quarter of 2000.
4)

The results from applying the Zivot-Andrews testing procedure are not reported here, but are
available on request from the authors.
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Potential reasons for the timing of these structural breaks using the IO
model for each of these variables is also provided in table 2. In the cases of
GDP95, GNI, GFCF, IM, Gc and CPI, the impact of the Asian currency
crisis and contagion from the third quarter and, more intensely, during the
fourth quarter of 1997 is the most obvious explanation for their structural
break at this time. For Ms the strong growth of GDP in 1990 and 1991
arising from strong domestic demand, particularly in the construction sector,
was met by the introduction of strong anti-inflationary stabilization measures
by the authorities that included the tightening of monetary conditions. For
Pc the structural break in quarter three of 1993 is likely to be a reflection of
the success of the anti inflationary measures of 1990-1991, which resulted in
a sharp decline in investment, consumption spending and overall economic
slowdown during 1992-1993. This also contributed to declining wage push
and further constrained private consumption spending. The structural break
for X in the third quarter of 2000 can be linked to a sharp decline in economic
growth in the US economy and globally, declining demand for Korea’s
exports, particularly of IT products (reflected in declining semi-conductor
sales) as well as a decline in semi-conductor prices. While, overall, export
growth for the whole of 2000 was quite strong, by the second half of the year
a deterioration was becoming apparent.
From table 3 the AO model shows that endogenously determined Tbs for the
ten macro variables of interest are, noticeably and surprisingly, quite
different from those specified using the IO models. For GDP95 the
endogenous structural break is found to occur in the second quarter of 1995.
This coincided with a peak in the business cycle at this time, and subsequent
downturns in the semi-conductor, metals and petrochemical businesses and a
deterioration in the terms of trade (from a decline, in particular, in the price
of semi-conductors). Korea was hit by its worst terms of trade conditions
since the oil shock of 1979 with a drop in export prices (semiconductor
prices) beginning in the second quarter of 1995, which had a profound effect
on Korea’s macroeconomic performance.
For GNI the endogenous structural break is found to occur in the third quater
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Figure 1 Plots of the Series and Estimated Timing of Structural Breaks
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Source: Derived by the authors.

of 1994. This coincided with the implementation of an expansionary
economic plan under the, then, new government led by Kim Young Sam; an
equipment and infrastructure investment boom; the further opening up of
domestic markets to foreign competition; the liberalization of foreign capital
inflows; a strong export performance assisted by a high yen which gave
Korean exporters a competitive advantage over Japanese exporters; a boom
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in construction and domestic infrastructure investment; and steadily rising
private consumption.
For Pc the endogenous structural break is found to occur in the third
quarter of 1997. During this period of time the contagion effect from the
Asian financial crisis was contributing to rapid declines in the value of
regional currencies and in regional stock markets. This compounded already
deteriorating macroeconomic conditions during the early part of 1997,
including a deterioration of the already shaky position of the financial sector
which, subsequently, became increasingly loan shy, and there was increased
anticipation of a rise in the rate of inflation. Further chaebol bankruptcies
throughout the year, including that of the Kia motor group in July 1997, as
well as increasing concern over the country’s ability to service its short-term
debts, further compounded the uncertainty and proved to be a drag on private
consumption spending.
The endogenous structural break for Gc is found to have occurred in the
fourth quarter of 1993. This can be potentially explained by the fact that
GDP growth declined sharply in 1992 and 1993 primarily due to a significant
slowdown in investment and consumption expenditure, as part of a
stabilization policy that also included a sharp decline in government
consumption expenditure to reduce inflationary pressure in the economy. By
1994 there was a modest recovery in government consumption expenditure.
The endogenous structural break for GFCF is found to have occurred in
the second quarter of 1994. This corresponds to the start of a boom in
construction, equipment and domestic infrastructure investment which
remained strong throughout the rest of 1994 and peaked in early 1995.
Thereafter, a prolonged period of steady decline, with some exceptions, in
the annual growth of GFCF until the first quarter of 1998 is apparent.
The endogenous structural break for X is found to have occurred in the
first quarter of 1985. The economic stabilization measures of the early 1980s,
introduced by the authoritarian government of President Chun Doo Hwan,
focusing upon economic stabilization and liberalization, began to produce
results by the mid 1980s. Inflation decreased, the economy recovered its
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competitiveness, productivity and growth. Export growth began to take-off
at this point such that by 1986 the nation experienced its first current account
surplus in its modern history.
The endogenous structural break for IM is found to have occurred in the
second quarter of 1994. During the early 1990s the country sustained high
export growth, however this rapid growth of exports occurred in conjunction
with an equally rapid growth of imports. Imports grew most noticeably over
the period 1994-1995, fuelled by increased imports of capital goods (32.5%),
industrial materials (32.6%) and consumer goods (27.8%). Substantial
imports of machinery and equipment were apparent for the economy and
seen as essential for the expansion and upgrading of productive capacity.
The government’s expansionary economic policy, domestic market opening
to foreign competition, liberalization of foreign capital inflows, the
construction and investment boom and rising private consumption
expenditure at this time all contributed to buoyant import demand.
The endogenous structural break for CPI is found to have occurred in the
first quarter of 1996. Consumer price inflation was generally on a downward
trend during the period of the 1990s, from relatively high rates in 1990 and
1991, with the exception of 1994. Price stability, however, became the
government’s primary focus during 1996. Stable agricultural prices,
increased competition from imports and subdued consumption spending
contributed to low inflation particularly in the second half of 1996. The
decline in inflation was also facilitated by excess capacity arising from the
equipment and investment boom of 1994-1995 and by a softening of global
demand in 1996.
In the case of Ms the endogenous structural break is found to occur in the
first quarter of 1997. Macroeconomic conditions deteriorated in early 1997
arising from labour unrest due to the proposed introduction of new legislation
making worker lay-offs easier, in conjunction with restrictions on union
activities. In the same quarter, 23 January 1997, the Hanbo debacle occurred.
Korea’s second biggest steel company imploded under a US$5.9 billion debt,
which took out its entire parent group the then fourteenth largest Korean
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conglomerate. The Bank of Korea swiftly injected 6 trillion won (US$7
billion) in liquidity to prevent a possible chain reaction of other corporate
bankruptcies which would then have a deleterious effect on the financial
sector.
Finally, the variable ER is found to have an endogenous structural break in
the first quarter of 1991. This is somewhat surprising, particularly given the
traumatic developments in the financial sector and the exchange rate in the
third and fourth quarters of 1997. However, during the early part of the
1990s the won did experience a continual depreciation against the US dollar.
The strong growth of the economy in 1990 and 1991, arising primarily from
the boom in the construction sector, resulted in an overheating of the
economy, rapid growth of private consumption and investment spending,
rapid expansion of imports, industrial materials and consumer goods in
particular, and inevitable trade and current account blow-outs. This
contributed to the weakening of the currency from 716.4 won per US dollar
in 1990 to 760.8 won per US dollar by 1991.
While the results presented and discussed in this section show some
interesting differences between Perron’s Innovational Outlier and additive
Outlier methodologies, which are the most advanced methodologies for the
examination of structural breaks in non-stationary time series, it is important
to note that these tests are unable to detect the presence of multiple structural
breaks. Therefore, the possibility exists that other potentially significant
breaks occurred during the period of analysis. Only the most significant of
these are detected through Perron’s methodologies.
In addition, it is also important to briefly address the marked differences in
the results obtained from the two approaches emphasized in this paper, and
summarized in tables 2 and 3. Table 2, based on the IO approach, indicates
that seven of the ten variables experienced a structural break around the
period of the financial crisis, while only one of the ten variables was found to
have experienced a structural break during this period using the AO approach.
The IO1 and IO2 approaches consider a break in the intercept only and the
intercept and slope respectively, while the AO approach takes into account a
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break in the slope only. Consequently, the assumption of whether or not
there is a break in the intercept appears to be critical for the results obtained.
The greater plausibility of the results obtained under the IO1 and IO2
approaches suggests, therefore, that the omission of an intercept break in the
AO approach would result in model misspecification for the case of Korea.

5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Korean economy has experienced intermittent periods of economic
turbulence, with the likelihood of resulting structural breaks, during its
prolonged period of economic growth and development since the early 1960s.
The most recent and obvious of these being the effects arising from the Asian
financial crisis of 1997, the tech wreck of 2000-2001 and the credit card
bubble of 2001-2002. The existence of such structural breaks means that
tests for non-stationarity of Korean macroeconomic data, particularly using
the conventional ADF test, may result in model misspecification and
coefficient bias unless such breaks are robustly and correctly identified.
Quarterly time series data for the Korean economy, covering the period
1980Q1-2005Q1, was used to determine the most important years for the
occurrence of structural breaks for key macroeconomic variables. In doing
so the paper compared and contrasted tests for stationarity using the
traditional ADF test procedure with that of the IO (which assumes a gradual
change in the intercept and/or slope) and AO (which assumes instantaneous
changes in intercept) model approaches, where the latter two both
endogenously determine the timing of structural breaks. The empirical
results presented showed that the conventional ADF unit root test and AO
model provided no evidence against the null hypothesis of unit roots in any
of the series under investigation. However, the IO model, which takes into
account the gradual effects of potential structural breaks in the series, found
that two of the variables examined are stationary. This finding is also
consistent with empirical results derivable using the Zivot-Andrews
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procedure. This indicates that considerable care must be taken when
conducting unit root tests on data that has a high likelihood of being subject
to structural breaks, as in the case of macroeconomic data for Korea.
While the IO and AO approaches used in this study are the most advanced
methods to endogenously detect for significant structural breaks, they are
unable to identify multiple structural breaks. As Ben-David and Papell
(1997) note, tests that allow for multiple structural breaks, such as Bai and
Perron (2003), are restricted to stationary and non-trending data which is not
the case for the variables under investigation in this research. Although this
paper has shed some light on the major structural breaks in Korean
macroeconomic data, and possible explanations and factors behind these,
future research should give more attention to the issue of multiple structural
breaks, especially when dealing with long-term time series data.
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